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This paper discusses the need and scope for an active fiscal stabilization policy. It is argued 
that the effectiveness of fiscal policy as a short run stabilizer does not depend on the long run 
multipliers of (balanced budget) fiscal policies. To the extent that activity can be affected by 
aggregate demand in the short run, there is a case for a fiscal stabilization policy in terms of 
temporary variations in taxes or public consumption contingent on the state of the economy. 
The effectiveness of fiscal policy is supported by empirical evidence. However, an 
appropriate policy intervention depends both on the nature of the shock and the structure of 
the economy. There are thus fundamental information problems in pursuing discretionary 
fiscal policies on top of political economy concerns, and fiscal fine-tuning is not to be 
recommended. Automatic stabilizers do not to the same extent suffer from these problems, 
but their strength is not by design but the net result of other policy considerations. Hence, 
there is a need to consider the structure and size of automatic stabilizers. 
JEL Code: E6. 
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gratefully acknowledged.. 1I n t r o d u c t i o n
The issue of the need and scope for stabilization policy remains topical in macro-
economics, and the debate has its own cycle oscillating between Keynesian and
classical viewpoints. Recently views on especially monetary policy have shifted
towards a greater belief in the possibility of controlling not only inﬂation, but
also activity via an active monetary policy.
Monetary policy has a comparative advantage over ﬁscal policy in
achieving countercyclical goals, Taylor (2000, p27)
There is a growing literature on the role of monetary policy, see e.g. Clarida,
Gali and Gertler (1999), Svenson (1999) and Svensson and Woodford (2005) and
for introduction and references. Somewhat surprisingly, ﬁscal policy has not at-
tracted as much interest, and recent literature devotes very scant attention to
ﬁscal stabilization policy.1This neglect of ﬁscal policy is surprising for at least
two reasons. First, policy makers are concerned about the role of ﬁscal policy
and often resort to ﬁscal policy changes in eﬀorts to stabilize the economy. Re-
cent examples include the US, UK and Denmark. Secondly, many countries,
notably the EMU countries, are left with ﬁscal policy as their only macroeco-
nomic policy instrument.2
This paper focuses on the need and scope for ﬁscal stabilization policy. The
outset of the paper is the recent progress in macroeconomic research on the ques-
tion of the need and scope for an active stabilization policy. The main lessons
are the following: Various forms of adjustment failures cause an inappropriate
adjustment to shocks. To the extent policy makers can respond to these shocks
in a way private markets cannot (due to contracts, adjustment costs or informa-
tional problems), there is a scope for an active stabilization policy.(for a recent
analysis see e.g. Benassy (2002)).
The need and scope for ﬁscal policy depend critically on the way aggregate
demand aﬀects activity and employment in the short run. The main channel of
ﬁscal policy is to aﬀect aggregate demand, and therefore a potential for ﬁscal
policy as a short run stabilizer depends critically on the extent to which activity
in the short run is inﬂuenced by aggregate demand. Fiscal policy may also
aﬀect the supply side, and this may release additional eﬀects to the traditional
aggregate demand eﬀects, but the supply eﬀects will in most cases be negligible
in the short run since they tend to unfold over time.
In the modern approach the gains from stabilization policy are not taken for
granted. The welfare case for an active stabilization policy is explicitly linked
to the ability of policy to cope with or diversify shocks in a way that diﬀers
1In a well-known textbook like Romer (1996), ﬁscal stabilization policy is only mentioned
i np a s s i n g ,a n di ne . g . W o o d f o r d( 2 0 0 3 ) ,ﬁscal policy is mainly discussed in relation to the
requirements for price stability. The so-called New Open Economy Macroeconomics is also
mainly focussed on monetary policy, see e.g. Lane (2001).
2With a ﬁxed exchange rate and liberalized capital movements, the standard Mundel-
Fleming model would imply that ﬁscal policy is a very eﬀective stabilization instrument.
2from what the market can accomplish under a non-interventionist policy.3.This
is related to both the adjustment processes, and the structure of capital markets
and imperfections in either may leave a need and scope for an active stabilization
policy. To the extent stabilization policies are able to diversify or smoothen the
consequences of business cycle ﬂuctuations they may also be interpreted as a
form of social insurance or risk diversiﬁcation/absorption. The
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 starts out by clarifying the
mechanisms through with ﬁscal policy may aﬀect activity in the short run. The
choice of instruments in ﬁscal policy, expenditures or taxes, is further considered
in section 3, and the eﬀectiveness of the instruments is related to the structure
of capital markets. The role of expectations in causing non-linearities and sign
reversals in the eﬀects of ﬁscal policy is discussed in section 4. Automatic stabi-
lizers are dealt with in section 5, and section 6 considers some political economy
aspects related to the active use of ﬁscal policy as a stabilization instrument.
Within the space allowed in this paper it is not possible to cover all aspects of
ﬁscal policy and important omissions include: coordination of ﬁscal and mon-
etary policy, debt dynamics and intergenerational distribution, and work on
optimal ﬁscal policies in dynamic models.
2 Fiscal policy - short run vs. long run eﬀects
It is useful to start by making a little detour into recent developments in macro-
economics to identify potential reasons why ﬁscal stabilization policy has not
been in focus. The quest for explicit microfoundation of macromodels has led to
substantial progress in understanding both the basic mechanisms causing busi-
ness cycle ﬂuctuations and why they may be associated with ineﬃciencies and
welfare losses. Moreover it has led to a better understanding of the channels
through which policy intervention may work. However, in a large part of the
literature the level of activity is supply determined. Accordingly the transmis-
sion mechanism of ﬁscal policy comes to run via supply incentives. In the often
considered closed economy model with "one good and no capital", this implies
that labour supply takes centre stage. An expansion of public consumption
leads to tax increases and the eﬀects on output depend on how labour supply
responds to the tax increase.4 In a well-known paper by Dixon (1987), ﬁscal
policy is considered in a setting with imperfectly competitive product markets
a n dl u m ps u mﬁnancing of public consumption implying that only the income
eﬀect is operative in aﬀecting labour supply (see also Mankiw (1988), Dixon
and Lawler (1996)). With lump sum ﬁnancing, higher public consumption and
thus taxation cause labour supply to increase, and therefore the ﬁscal multiplier
3Musgrave’s famous distinction between the allocative, distributional and stabilization ef-
fects of policy teaches us to distinguish the three. However, modern literature has shown that
it is not meaningful to make such a distinction. When cast in an explicit microfounded model,
the role for stabilization relies on adjustment failures and failures in risk diversiﬁcation, and
both have allocative and distributional consequences and vice versa.
4In models with imperfectly competitive labour markets, the eﬀects depend on how taxation
inﬂuences wage formation, see e.g. Pissarides (1998).
3is positive. Baxter and King (1993) arrived at similar conclusions in an RBC
type model. Allowing for distortionary taxation, it follows that the eﬀect of
a tax increase on labour supply depends on the balance between income and
substitution eﬀect.5 The net eﬀect of a ﬁscal expansion on activity is therefore
in general ambiguously signed6 when assessed from this supply side perspective.
This line of approach has been extended by considering the incentive eﬀects
of taxation on savings, capital formation, wage formation etc. (see e.g. Baxter
and King (1993) and Alesina et. al. (2002)). However, a fundamental question
is whether it is appropriate to consider business cycle ﬂuctuations as movement
up and down the labour supply curve and leaving no role for aggregate demand.
I ti sw e l lk n o w nt h a tm o d e l sw i t ht h i sa p p r o a c hh a v ed i ﬃculties explaining
stylized facts concerning the labour market (Stadler (1994)) and in generating
plausible business cycles (Cogley and Mason (1995)).
A volumniuous literature considers the role of failures in adjustment of prices
and wages. These models usually assume that activity in the short run (period
in which adjustment failures apply) is determined by demand. However, the
usual procedure is to let aggregate demand be determined by aggregate nom-
inal demand where the latter is determined by monetary policy (for a recent
example see Woodford (2003)). This feature arises in a large class of models
where a money demand relation is derived from a "money in utility" approach,
cash in advance constraints or an overlapping generations structure. Hence,
these models are demand driven in the short run, but by nominal and not real
demand. An indication why this approach is problematic is that models with
price stickiness have diﬃculties matching observed comovements between, say,
consumption and activity. In the data, correlation between the two is high (usu-
ally above 0.8), while in a calibrated RBC model with nominal stickiness it is
very low (about 0.2), see e.g. Hairualt and Portier (1993).7 This suggests that
both the approach to determination of activity in the short run and consumption
(intertemporal consumption model) may be questioned.
For the subsequent discussion of ﬁscal policy it is therefore important to
bring out the demand channels through which ﬁscal policy can aﬀect aggregate
5Consider a household maximizing a standard utility function U(C,1 − L) subject to C =
(1 − τ)W
P L + I,w h e r eC is consumption, L work, W
P the real wage, τ the tax rate, and














≶ 0 under standard sign assumptions.
6There is still some confusion about this in the literature. Often utility functions that im-
pose particular assumptions on the income and substitution eﬀects are chosen . For instance
the popular Cobb-Douglas speciﬁcation implies that the income and substitution eﬀects bal-
ance each other, leaving labour supply unaﬀected by an income tax (if labour income is the
only source of income).
7It is well known that the standard RBC model replicates the movements of aggregate
demand movements quite well, not least private consumption, cf. e.g. Prescott (1987). This
may seem surprising since the model relies on the intertemporal consumption model, which in
other respects is known to have empirical problems. The key to reconciling these two ﬁndings
may lie in the fact that the RBC model is calibrated with very persistent real shocks. In this
case, the intertemporal consumption model implies a marginal propensity to consume close
to one, cf. section 3.
4activity.
2.1 Adjustment failures and ﬁscal stabilization policy
A traditional reason for aggregate demand to play a role for activity is the
presence of various adjustment failures. As noted above a large literature has
explored this in a setting where aggregate demand is determined by nominal
demand (the money supply). However, considering a setting in which monetary
policy determines the nominal interest rate implies that aggregate real demand
as in the traditional textbook model come to determine activity in the short run
(the time frame within which adjustment failures prevail). A simple example is
an intertemporal model for a closed economy with nominal wage contracts. In
this setting it is straightforward that the short run aggregate supply curve is
increasing in the aggregate price level (up to a capacity constraint), while the
aggregate demand curve is downward sloping since a higher price aﬀects the
expected real rate of interest and therefore aggregate demand, cf. Appendix A
for an illustrative model. Changes in aggregate demand inﬂuence activity and a
ﬁscal expansion will therefore be able to induce higher activity, see also Benassy
(2002)
This approach leaves several important lessons concerning the role of ﬁscal
stabilization policy. First, the short run eﬀect of a ﬁscal expansion is indepen-
dent of the factors determining the long run eﬀects of ﬁscal policy on activity,
i.e. there is a case for a traditional countercyclical stabilization policy even if the
long run ﬁscal multiplier may be negative. Second, the room for ﬁscal policy is
shock dependent. Third, the room for ﬁscal stabilization is generated by the fact
that activity is sub-optimal in the short run due to adjustment failures. There
is thus a welfare case for an active policy to the extent that it can counteract
the eﬀects of shocks in way in which the market is not able to do so. Finally,
but crucially, the stabilization policy thus has to be temporary (being deﬁned
as the time span for which adjustment failures cause activity to be suboptimal
low) and adapted to both the shock and the adjustment process in the economy.
2.2 Composition of demand
The preceding analysis was based on adjustment failures for wages (or prices)
as a way to allow activity to be demand determined in the short run. There
is another important route through which ﬁscal policy can aﬀect activity in
the short run even in the absence of adjustment failures for wages and prices.
This arises via the eﬀect a change in public consumption may have on the
composition of demand. In aggregate models this is most easily seen8 in the
context of an open economy model with a distinction between tradeable and
non-tradeable commodities. Domestic demand plays no role for determination
of activity in the former market, but does in the latter. If public consumption
8See Dixon and Rankin (1994) for a discussion of the role of the composition of demand
in models with imperfectly competitive markets.
5is more directed towards non-tradeables than tradeables,9 it follows that an
expansion of public consumption (even under a balanced budget) will change
the composition of demand, and therefore in general the level of activity (see
e.g. Marston (1985)). Andersen (2004) shows in an intertemporal model for
an open economy under the product market structure stipulated above that a
temporary increase in public consumption will boost current activity (and lower
future activity) independently of the sign of the long run multiplier. This applies
irrespective of type of shock and whether lump sum or distortionary taxes are
used (Andersen and Holden (2002)).
2.3 What should be stabilized?
The traditional literature has taken the policy objective of stabilizing output as
given10. More recent approaches building on an explicit microfoundation make
it possible to assess the welfare implications of ﬂuctuations,. see e.g. Obst-
feld and Rogoﬀ (2002), Woodford (2003), Andersen and Spange (2004). This
naturally leads to an explicit consideration of the consequences of risk and the
possibilities of diversifying them via e.g. stabilization policy. Accordingly stabi-
lization policy can be interpreted as a form of (implicit) insurance in the sense
that it modiﬁes the consequences of various shocks, i.e. shock diversiﬁcation.
Maximizing of welfare is therefore not necessarily tantamount to minimization
of say output variability.
This naturally raises the question of the welfare costs of business and thereby
also the potential gains from an active stabilization policy. Lucas (1987) ques-
tioned whether the welfare costs of business cycles are signiﬁcant, and suggested
that they are not. By implication the potential gains from an active stabilization
policy are bound to be small. Recent work has challenged this conclusion see
e.g. Gali, Gertler, and Lopez-Salido (2003) and Storesletten, Telmer and Yaron
(2004). In particular market imperfections including capital market structures
as well as heterogeneity among agents are crucial for the size of the welfare eﬀects
of business cycle ﬂuctuations. Allowing for heterogeneity and non-diversiﬁable
risk among agents imply that the welfare costs of business cycle ﬂuctuations
may be non-trivial. This is an important area for future research.
Finally, the importance of stabilization policy is also supported by a revealed
preference argument. The fact that so many commentators, institutions and
policy-makers are concerned about business cycle ﬂuctuations and stabilization
policy suggests that this must be important. In this respect it is interesting to
note that it is very hard to ﬁnd comments on business cycle developments that
do not focus on how aggregate demand is evolving.
9Which is empirically the case since most public consumption is wage expenses, which by
deﬁnition are directed towards non-tradeables markets (national labour markets).
10The issue of stabilization is here distinguished for the question of lowering unemployment.
The latter involves structural issues causing a persistently ineﬃciently low level of activity.
63 Fiscal instruments: expenditures and taxes
An important question is which ﬁscal instruments to use. In a short run per-
spective, the question is to identify the most eﬀective instrument in inﬂuencing
aggregate demand: is it expenditure changes or tax changes? The answer turns
out to depend critically on the structure of capital markets.
3.1 Ricardian equivalence
An issue which often comes up is whether Ricardian equivalence would eliminate
the scope for a ﬁscal stabilization policy. To see that this is not the case consider
the following deterministic setting. Capital markets are perfect (in the sense of
oﬀering a known real rate of return r), and households have an inﬁnite horizon.
A combination of assumptions that hardly can be said to have a Keynesian
bias. Let the household utility function be deﬁned over utility derived from





















where Yt+i denotes income, Tt+i denotes lump sum taxes paid in period t + i
and r is the market rate of interest (assumed constant over time for simplicity).
Assuming for the sake of argument that the objective and subjective rates of
time preference are the same ( 1
1+r = β), it follows that the optimal consumption
decision implies















































7where Gt+i is public consumption in period t+i. The consumption function (1)
gives consumption according to the standard intertemporal consumption model,
where there is a desire to smooth consumption, which therefore is determined
by the present value of disposable income.
For a given consumption proﬁle, a temporal shifting of taxes (e.g. lowering
current taxes and increasing future taxes) would not aﬀect private consump-
tion and thus aggregate demand. A change in public consumption would how-
ever aﬀect private consumption. If the aim is to increase current aggregate
demand (C + G), it follows straightforward that temporary changes in public
consumption would be fairly eﬀective since the eﬀect on private consumption







Crowding out depends on the discount rate, and if r ∈ [0.02,0.04], it follows
that ∂Ct
∂Gt |temporary∈ [−0.02,−0.05],a n d∂Ct+Gt
∂Gt |temporary∈ [0.95,0.98], i.e. the
(intertemporally balanced budget) multiplier is close to one11.N o t e t h a t t h i s
holds under rational expectations. Under Ricardian Equivalence an increase in
public consumption crowds out private consumption, but if the former is tem-
porary, the crowding out eﬀect is very small. The reason is that households
aim at smoothing the consumption proﬁle, and therefore the increase in taxa-
tion needed to ﬁnance the temporary expansion in public consumption is spread
over time. Ricardian equivalence does not make a temporary increase in public
consumption an ineﬀective instrument to increase total demand (C + G). Ac-
tually, the longer the horizon of the household, the stronger the diversiﬁcation
eﬀect as captured here by assuming an inﬁnite horizon. It is important that the
change is temporary (and is perceived as such). For a fully permanent change
in public consumption, crowding out will be complete ( ∂Ct
∂Gt |permanent= −1),
and aggregate demand would be unaﬀected.
3.2 Capital market imperfections
Under Ricardian equivalence temporary changes in taxes have no (or a very
small) eﬀect on private consumption and thus aggregate demand. This results
depends critically on the assumption that there is a given interest rate at which
the household can transfer resources back and forth over time (no liquidity
constraints). In combination with the assumption of inﬁnitely lived households,
this delivers very strong, but also debatable results like the irrelevance of the
public sector budget position. Some of the basic reasons why business cycles
pose a problem are related to capital market imperfections, and it is therefore
natural to consider their role in more detail.
Liquidity constraints
11Even allowing for distortionary taxation would not change the thrust of this argument,
since the permanent increase in the tax rate would be small.
8A crucial assumption underlying the intertemporal consumption model is
that agents can borrow based on expected future labour income. Borrowing
with collateral in future labour income raises fundamental incentive problems
involving moral hazard and adverse selection. There are thus good reasons why
there are restricted possibilities for moving consumption possibilities based on
expected future labour income to the present.
A limiting form of capital market imperfection arises when households are
liquidity constrained, that is, those households that like to borrow to increase
current consumption are unable to do so. Following this line of thought one may
think of aggregate private consumption as being determined as (see Jappelli and
Pagano (1989), Campell and Mankiw (1991))
Ct = πtCt |constrained +(1 − πt)Ct |unconstrained
where π is the fraction of liquidity constrained consumers ("hand to mouth"
consumers) with consumption C |constrained being determined by disposable in-
come, while the unconstrained households have consumption given as C |unconstrained
determined by the standard intertemporal consumption model. Consider now












∂Tt ' −1 and
∂Ct|unconstrained
∂Tt ' 0 it follows that ∂Ct
∂Tt ' −πt.T h e
marginal consumption eﬀect is (approximately) given by the fraction of liquidity
constrained households. In the case of large tax changes, note that the fraction
of liquidity constrained consumers may also change.
Note that it in general may be more natural to think of credit market im-
perfections as being asymmetric. Agents wanting to postpone consumption
possibilities can do so more easily than agents wanting to move consumption
forward to the present. This implies that the consequences of a tax increase
may diﬀer from the eﬀect of a tax increase.
The importance of liquidity constraints has been addressed in many empir-
ical studies, and in a recent analysis involving 20 OECD countries, Sarantis
and Stewart (2003) ﬁnd that the average estimate of π is 0.7 (minimum value
0.33 and maximum value 0.99), suggesting that liquidity constraints play a non-
trivial role. It follows that a temporary tax reduction could have a signiﬁcant
eﬀect on private consumption. This relates also to the voluminous literature
testing for Ricardian Equivalence, and it is generally rejected (for a recent sur-
vey and references see Ricciuti (2003)).
Microevidence on this issue is found in studies testing whether agents are able
to diversify consumption risk as would be implied by complete capital markets
(see e.g. Dynarski et.al. (1997), Gruber (1997), Knieser and Ziliak (2002)).
Such diversiﬁcation of consumption risk is in general clearly rejected, indicating
that capital markets are incomplete, and changes in disposable income are found
to have a signiﬁcant eﬀect on consumption.
Precautionary savings
9The intertemporal consumption model is usually presented in a form with
perfect foresight or where certainty equivalence holds. However, when capital
markets are incomplete and labour income non-diversiﬁable there is a precau-
tionary motive for saving, i.e. to ensure consumption possibilities also in periods
with low income. This may be interpreted as "buﬀer stock" saving behaviour,
cf.. Carroll (2001) in the sense that agents will target a given level of "cash-
on-hand" (relative to permanent income) given by ﬁnancial wealth and current
income. If "cash-on-hand" is below target, agents will try to re-build the stock,
and if it is above, it can be depleted. An important implication is that the mar-
ginal propensity to consume out of "cash-on-hand" is much above that predicted
by the intertemporal consumption model. Carroll (2001) presents numerical il-
lustrations for a population with a given distribution of wealth and income risk
and ﬁnds an average marginal propensity to consume of 1/3. Accordingly, a
temporary tax reduction would also here have a signiﬁcant eﬀect on private
consumption.
Note that agents under precautionary savings behave very much like "credit
constrained" individuals facing liquidity constraints. For example, agents with
low "cash-on-hand" will tend to spend their income and have a marginal propen-
sity to consume equal to one.
3.3 Empirical evidence
For the design of stabilization policy it is important to have a quantitative as-
sessment of the eﬀectiveness by which changes in public expenditures or taxes
can aﬀect activity. While there is a voluminous empirical literature on ﬁscal
policy, it is important in interpreting the results to distinguish between the
eﬀects of stabilization policy and the eﬀects of a given change in ﬁscal pol-
icy12.T h ef o r m e ri sd e ﬁned in relation to a particular business cycle situation,
whereas there can be many other reasons for changes in public consumption or
taxes. Evidence on the latter may therefore not be an appropriate yardstick
for evaluating the scope for the former. In the same vein observe that assessing
discretionary changes in ﬁscal policy by changes in the structural budget deﬁcit
is also problematic both because such changes can be driven by other causes
than ﬁscal policy,13 and because the activity eﬀects of ﬁscal policy changes are
not well approximated by their eﬀects on the public budget.
Fiscal multipliers can be assessed from various macroeconometric models.
In a recent survey, Hemming et.. al. (2002) conclude that although the range of
short-run multipliers is wide, the expenditure multipliers tend to be in the range
0.6 to 1.4 (meaning that a one percentage increase in government consumption
will increase GDP by 0.6 to 1.4%), and the tax multipliers in the range 0.3 to
0.8. Moreover, the multipliers are signiﬁcantly smaller in the long run than in
12An example is VAR-analysis where impulse response functions are generated to innova-
tions in ﬁscal policy. These innovations are by construction unrelated to the state of the
economy, and therefore they do not capture stabilization policies which by deﬁnition are mo-
tivated by a particuar business cycle situation.
13For instance changes in labour market structures.
10the short run.
Analyses based on smaller structural models have also been used to assess
the eﬀects of ﬁscal policy.14 One recent example is Alesina et. al. (2002), which
focusses on the possible crowding out eﬀects of ﬁscal policy running via wages,
proﬁts and investment. Two interesting conclusions come out of this analysis.
The short run multipliers always have the conventional signs, although the long
run multipliers may display non-Keynesian signs. This stresses the point made
above that the scope for short run stabilization cannot be asserted by evaluating
long run multipliers. Second, the multipliers - both in the short and long run -
depend critically on the speciﬁc ﬁscal instrument. This also underlines that the
ﬁscal stance is only poorly approximated by the structural balance.
Estimations of ﬁscal reaction functions can be used to asses whether ﬁscal
policy has been countercyclical and contributing to stabilization, see e.g. Auer-
bach (2003) and Gali and Perotti (2003). Both analyses ﬁnd that the ﬁscal
policy reactions have been countercyclical, and in this way they can be said to
have contributed to stabilization15.
Finally, the importance of changes in ﬁscal policy for aggregate activity can
also be assessed by the so-called VAR approach in which the dynamic response
to shocks to spending and taxes can be traced. In a recent analysis, Blanchard
and Perotti (2002) ﬁnd that spending shocks have positive and tax shocks have
negative output eﬀects, and that the eﬀects are fairly persistent.
When ﬁscal policy is eﬀective, there is also a risk that it may be "misused"
in the sense of contributing to output destabilization. This may arise either
because ﬁscal policy interventions are badly designed and timed relative to the
business cycle situation, or because ﬁscal policy is changed for reasons unrelated
to the business cycle (destabilizing eﬀects may be perceived or not). Fatás and
Mihov (2003) thus ﬁnd that countries with the most volatile public consumption
also tend to have the most volatile business cycles. Whether this supports a case
against ﬁscal discretion is an open question as long as the reasons for changes
in ﬁscal policy have not been identiﬁed.
.
4E x p e c t a t i o n s
While there is an extensive literature on the role of expectations for the eﬀects of
monetary policy, there has been less focus on how expectation formation inﬂu-
ences ﬁscal policy multipliers. However, expectations about future ﬁscal policy
may have important eﬀects if agents are forward looking (rational expectations).
It is clear from the preceding discussion that it is crucial whether a ﬁscal
policy intervention is perceived as temporary. If changes in ﬁscal policy intended
to be temporary are perceived by the private sector as permanent then the
14Finally, the eﬀects of ﬁscal policy have also been evaluated in calibrated models, see e.g.
Baxter and King (1993).
15Lane (2003) presents empirical evidence interpreted as showing the inﬂuence of political
economy factors for the cyclical properties of ﬁscal policy.
11stabilization eﬀort will be muted or may be even overturned. To see this, return
to the standard intertemporal consumption model of section 3.1. If there is a
temporary change in public consumption, the eﬀect on private consumption is
∂Ct
∂Gt |temporary= − r
1+r; if the tax change is perceived to be permanent, the eﬀect
is ∂Ct
∂Gt |permanent= −1,c f . .a b o v e .
It follows that the crowding out eﬀect depends critically on expectations. A
policy intervention intended to be temporary, but perceived as persistent will
be much less eﬀective than one for which it is credible that it is temporary. Ac-
cordingly, expectations matter as much for ﬁscal policy as for monetary policy.
An important point is that expectations of future ﬁscal policy may depend
on the present ﬁscal stance, e.g. the current expenditure level or the current
debt level. This is so since these levels may signal something about future ﬁscal
policy, and thereby inﬂuence expectations formation. This link to expectations
may cause non-linearities or state dependencies in the eﬀects of ﬁscal policy,
that is, the eﬀects of ﬁscal policy intervention may depend critically on the
initial policy situation. To see how this can arise, consider ﬁrst a case where
Ricardian Equivalence holds implying that the expected present value of public
consumption is inﬂuencing private consumption, cf.. (1). Assume that public
consumption follows a stochastic process with upward drift, and that it ﬂuctu-
ates within an upper and lower bound (Bertola and Drazen (1993)). The inter-
pretation is that whenever public consumption reaches a high level (the upper
bound) there is a consolidation (to ensure sustainability) lowering public con-
sumption (to the lower bound) upon which the process starts again. Under these
assumptions, the expected present value of public consumption is dependent on
the current level of public consumption. If the current level is low, increases are
expected, while if the current level is close to the upper level, a consolidation is
approaching. Hence, for a low level of public consumption, the expected present
value of public consumption is higher than its current level, and vice versa for
a high level close to the upper bound. At low levels of public consumption, an
expansion in public consumption will thus increase the expected present value
of government consumption, and this will lower private consumption (though
less than one-to-one), i.e. there is crowding out of private consumption. At a
high level of public consumption, an increase in public consumption may lower
the expected present value of future public consumption since the point of con-
solidation is coming closer, and therefore private consumption may increase, i.e.
there is a crowding in eﬀect. The point is that the ﬁscal multiplier depends
on the level of public consumption because the latter inﬂuences the expected
present value of future public consumption and thus how private consumption
is adjusted.
A similar mechanism may arise in the absence of Ricardian equivalence.
Assume the proﬁle for public consumption to be given, and consider the eﬀects
of a change in tax policy, e.g. lowering taxes today would increase the deﬁcit
and call for higher taxes in the future. Sutherland (1997) considers this issue
in a so-called "perpetual youth" model in which private households discount
the future more (due to the probability of dying) than the government. The
12government may lower taxes and create deﬁcits, but there is an upper level of
debt which is feasible (given sustainability), and if this debt level is reached, a
consolidation in the form of tax increases takes place. Consider the eﬀects of a
tax reduction causing a budget deﬁcit and rising debt. If the initial debt level
is low, the deﬁcit would have only a small eﬀect on expected future taxes, and
therefore private consumption would increase. However, at a high debt level
a further deﬁcit would make the point of consolidation and thus tax increases
approaching, and therefore private consumption may fall. Both the size and
sign of how taxes aﬀect private consumption are thus dependent on the level of
debt.
An intriguing question is whether expectations may reverse the signs of ﬁscal
multipliers such that a ﬁscal consolidation may turn out to be expansionary. An
interesting possibility for many countries facing the twin problems of systematic
public deﬁcits and high unemployment. The basic idea for an "expansionary
consolidation" is that a change in current ﬁscal policy signals something about
future policies, cf.. above, which in turn may aﬀect expectations and therefore
private decision making like consumption and investment. The premise is that
activity in the short run is determined by aggregate demand, and the question
is whether a contraction of, say, public consumption or a tax increase may
expand private demand. In the case considered by Sutherland (1997), this
arises straightforward at a high debt level. In the Bertola and Drazen (1993)
set-up, it arises in the case of an unanticipated consolidation (before the upper
bound is reached), in which case there is an unanticipated fall in the expected
present value of taxes, and therefore private consumption increases. It is worth
stressing that an expansion in private demand following e.g. a contraction of
public demand is a necessary, but not suﬃcient condition for a ﬁscal contraction
to be expansionary. An expansion requires that the net eﬀect on aggregate
demand is positive.
There has been an extensive debate on the possibility of encountering ex-
pansionary ﬁscal contractions, various case studies have been undertaken, and
econometric studies of the issue have been performed (see e.g. Giudice et. al.
(2003)). This is not the place for a detailed discussion of this literature, but
two points are worth stressing . First, it is unclear in the case studies and
in the econometric work whether the eﬀects of ﬁscal policy changes have been
adequately separated from other changes in the same periods.16 Second, even
leaving this aside, the econometric evidence sends an unclear message. Fiscal
contractions may or may not be expansionary, but as long as we don’t know the
precise conditions underlying whether one or the other holds, this is of little use
in policy recommendations.
To sum up, expectation eﬀects may imply that ﬁscal policy eﬀects become
more or less Keynesian,17 and hence it is not possible to make unambiguous
16As an example the ﬁscal consolidation in Denmark in the early 1980s is often mentioned
as a prime example of an expansionary ﬁscal contraction. However, it coincided with a tight
income policy, a shift in exchange rate policy and liberalization of ﬁnancial markets.
17Van Haan (2004) shows how ﬁscal policy can aﬀect whether the economy approaches a
low or high unemployment equilibrium in the presence of multiple equilibria.
13conclusions on how expectation formation inﬂuences ﬁscal policy. Expectation
formation has implications for implementation of ﬁscal policy, cf.. below, and
one lesson from the empirical evidence is that expectations matter, and cred-
ibility problem make it is easier to have them working against you than for
you.
5 Fiscal Rules - Automatic stabilizers
The previous discussion has dealt with discretionary changes in ﬁscal policy
where policy intervention is based on an assessment of the current business cycle
situation. Therefore problems of information and implementation (including
political economy aspects) are important, cf.. below. This is to a lesser extent
the case for the part of ﬁscal stabilization policy which is rule based due to
automatic reactions in public consumption and in particular taxation when the
business cycle situation changes. This is a consequence of the way in which
social, labour and tax policies are designed, since this in general introduces
state contingencies in the case of entitlements in the case of a lost job, or tax
payment contingent on income etc. In a macrocontext these reaction are known
as automatic stabilizers or the automatic budget response.
In a setting with capital market imperfections it is possible to interpret
automatic stabilizers as an implicit insurance mechanism, since such a policy
eﬀectively introduces contingencies in e.g. taxes, expenditures and thus in gen-
eral in the budget, which in turn aﬀects the allocation of risk across agents
and time. This interpretation is interesting because it brings forth the relation-
ship between stabilization policy and the welfare state.18 Market failures in the
provision of insurance are particularly important in a discussion of the welfare
state, since many public sector activities can be interpreted as social insurance,
that is, the public sector oﬀers services and transfers if various contingencies are
realized through life. Hence, the arrangements which in an ex post sense may
be interpreted as serving a redistributive role will often in an ex ante sense have
an insurance function. Modern economic theory has shown that this applies
widely to public services, transfers and taxation (see e.g. Barr (2004)).
To illustrate the basic risk sharing aspects of ﬁscal rules consider the follow-
ing stylized case. There is an exogenous, but stochastic output level Y = Y +ε
(Y can be interpreted as steady state output, and ε a stochastic innovation
where Eε =0 ), that can be used for private (C) or public (G) consumption
(Y = C+G). Assume that public consumption is given as G = G+κε,w h e r eκ
is the state contingency or "automatic stabilizer" in ﬁscal policy. Suppose that
the government is utilitarian and chooses G and κ to maximize
E [U(C)+V (G)] U0 > 0,U00 < 0,V0 > 0,V00 < 0
18The interpretation in terms of social insurance also raises problems for the usual approach
of separating stabilization policy from the aim to correct for market failures and to pursue
redistributive policies (the Musgrave distinction). Market failures provide a rationale for
stabilization policy, and such policies provide insurance which can be hard to distinguish from
redistribution
14subject to Y + ε = C + G + κε. Note that the utility of private and public
consumption is assumed to be given by diﬀerent utility functions, but they
both display risk aversion. Moreover in this static setting it is impossible to
distinguish between contingencies in public consumption and taxes, since the
budget by deﬁnition has to be balanced. It follows straightforward that it is
optimal for the policy maker to choose a κ>0. Since private consumption is
given as
C = Y − G +( 1− κ)ε
introducing a state contingency in public consumption (κ>0) reduces the
variance of private consumption (
∂Var(c)
∂κ < 0)a n ds e t t i n gκ>0 is optimal
since it diversiﬁes risk between public and private consumption. Eﬀectively
ﬁscal policy works as a shock absorber, some of the (non-diversiﬁable) risk is
absorbed by the public sector, and therefore private consumption becomes less
volatile. One could also say that the cost of a stabilization policy reducing
private consumption variability is measured in terms of the increased variability
in public consumption. A further implication is that the optimal policy has a
procyclical variation in taxation, in periods with high income more resources are
transferred to the public sector, and given the static set-up, public consumption
therefore increases. This illustrative static case brings forth that there are some
scope for risk diversiﬁcation via ﬁscal policy even under a balanced budget, i.e.
diversiﬁcation of risk does not require that the policy can run non-balanced
budgets.
In an intertemporal set-up the scope for risk diversiﬁcation by automatic sta-
bilizers becomes stronger since transitory shocks can be diversiﬁed over time. If
the conditions for Ricardian Equivalence do not hold,19 the temporal allocation
of tax payments matters. Accordingly it may become possible to diversify the
income risk faced by households without necessarily having to transfer the risk
into public sector activities to which there is also risk aversion. To see this,
assume that agents are liquidity constrained such that private consumption is
determined by disposable income (this could arise if agents are liquidity con-
strained, cf.. section 3 or in an overlapping generations model, cf.. Andersen
and Dogonowski (2002)). Assume that income Yi is stochastic (with given mean
and variance) and that the tax rate for an income level Yi is τ(Yi) ≥ 0.I tf o l -
lows straightforward that disposable income equals (1 − τ (Yi))Yi, and clearly
the disposable income becomes less sensitive to variations in gross income, i.e.
∂ (1 − τ (Yi))Yi
∂Yi





τ(Yi) is the elasticity of the tax rate wrt. income, i.e. it
measures the degree of progression in the tax system.
19Note that suﬃcient conditions for this buﬀer or insurance function via the public budget
to have beneﬁcial welfare eﬀects are that agents have ﬁnite horizons (as opposed to the public
sector) or can access the capital market on better terms (a lower rate of interest).
15It is seen that the tax system implies20 that there is less variability in dis-
p o s a b l ei n c o m et h a ni ng r o s si n c o m e .
Va r[(1 − τ (Yi))Yi] <Va r[Yi]
Note that a proportional taxation scheme (η(Yi)=0 )i ss u ﬃcient to provide risk
diversiﬁcation, but a progressive taxation scheme (η(Yi) > 0) makes disposable
income even more stable. If taxes are contingent on the state of nature - as any
income tax scheme will be - then there is an insurance element involved (ﬁrst
pointed out by Domar and Musgrave (1944)) that entails a transfer from the
lucky (those with a high income) to the unlucky (those with a low income). If
agents are risk averse and capital markets incomplete, it follows that policies
which can diversify risk may potentially improve welfare.
The index i can be interpreted as running over diﬀerent individuals, in
which case the taxation scheme provides insurance to individual or idiosyncratic
shocks21 (Varian (1980), Sinn (1995)). It can also be interpreted as a time in-
dex in which case there is insurance over time to aggregate shocks (Gordon and
Varian (1988), Andersen and Dogonowski (2002)).
To interpret the risk diversiﬁcation achieved in the case of aggregate shocks,
note that the public budget plays a key role. When Ricardian equivalence
does not hold, the budget provides a buﬀer or insurance function via the basic
mechanism that it can be used to smooth the consequences of aggregate shocks
over time. In this way it can oﬀer an "implicit" diversiﬁcation possibility, which
can be diﬃcult to establish in private markets22. To see this, consider the
following case. Output is stochastic, but exogenous, and there is a given level
of public consumption to be ﬁnanced by an income tax. If the budget has to
balance period by period, the tax rate becomes countercyclical. In good states
of nature with high income, the tax rate is low, and vice versa in a bad states of
nature with low income. This will tend to reinforce the ﬂuctuations in disposable
income. If instead a non-balanced budget is allowed it is optimal to have a
procyclical tax rate and budget. In good states of nature the tax rate is increased
and the budget in surplus, and vice versa in bad states of nature. This implies
that disposable income and thus consumption is stabilized or smoothened. If this
form of diversiﬁcation cannot be established in private markets,23 and agents
are risk averse there are clear welfare gains from such a policy. Notice that
a procyclical tax rate (η>0) achieves more risk diversiﬁcation of disposable
income than a proportional tax rate (η =0 ). This result on the tax structure
holds also with endogenous production where the business cycle is generated by
e.g. productivity shocks, and the tax instrument is an income tax, which distorts
20This holds for τ (Yi)[1+η (Yi)] > 0, which has as a suﬃcient condition τ (Yi) > 0 and
η (Yi) > 0.
21Note that the insurance eﬀect is present to idiosyncratic shocks even though Ricardian
equivalence holds in the aggregate, since this form of risk diversiﬁc a t i o nc a nb ea c h i e v e dv i aa
balanced budget, and therefore the basic eﬀect does not rely on budget imbalances aﬀecting
behaviour.
22For instance risk diversiﬁcation across diﬀerent generations.
23Private markets may e.g. have diﬃculties in diversifying aggregate persistent shocks.
16the labour supply decision (see Andersen and Dogonowski (2002)). Hence, the
contingency built into the taxation scheme works both to diversify idiosyncratic
and aggregate risk. This also brings forth the close relationship between welfare
arrangements and stabilization policy.
In practice it is easier to implement stabilizers working through taxation and
transfer payments. On the expenditures side it is more diﬃcult except for ex-
penditures directly related to unemployment. Beyond that there is some scope
for introducing contingencies on the consumption side via e.g. nominal bud-
geting rules. However, such rules introduce variability in public consumption
to which agents may be equally risk averse as to variability in public consump-
tion, and it is therefore not obvious that it is desirable to strengthen stabilizers
on the expenditure side, cf.. above. An exception is public investment (in in-
frastructures etc.) since the marginal social costs of such projects are smaller
in a recession than in an upswing, and this gives an argument for making such
activities countercyclical. Given the time lags involved in most public invest-
ment projects, there is a question of how far it is possible to go in establishing
the proper cyclical dependency in public sector investments.
Shocks - type and persistence
The automatic stabilizers arising from contingencies built into tax, social and
labour market policies etc. have the advantage that they have zero information
and implementation lags, and in general also a short impact lag. This is unique
also compared to monetary policy. However, by the nature of being automatic
it follows that they do not distinguish between the type of shock aﬀecting say
income. Two dimensions of the shock are important, namely the nature of the
shock (demand or supply) and its persistence (temporary or permanent).
Is it a problem that the response is the same irrespective of the nature of the
shock? That is, independently of whether the shock arises on the demand or the
supply side, the automatic stabilizers tend to react to the implied responses in
e.g. income. The answer to this question is complicated. First, the automatic
stabilizer arising via the tax system works in the right direction to stabilize
disposable income and therefore private consumption irrespective of whether
shocks arise on the demand or the supply side (see Andersen and Dogonowski
(2002)). In general it also works to stabilize activity. However, the stabilization
of activity required is in general diﬀerent for demand and supply shocks, and
this creates a potential problem. This can be exempliﬁed by the result from
Andersen and Holden (2002), in which the role of ﬁscal stabilization policy is
considered for a two sector (tradeables and non-tradeables) open economy, in
which ﬁscal policy runs via public demand for non-tradeables, cf.. section 2.2.
In this particular setting it is shown that stabilization of private consumption is
tantamount to stabilizing the terms of trade. However, the eﬀects on the terms
of trade of supply (productivity) and demand shocks are in general opposite in
direction, and therefore the optimal ﬁscal policy response is shock dependent. In
this framework stabilization from the tax side would work in the right direction
for both types of shocks, but the required adjustment would be shock dependent.
For automatic stabilizers primarily running via taxation, however, it is diﬃcult
to imagine a system where the automatic tax response depends on the type of
17shock to income.24 Some diﬀerentiation to the response to diﬀerent types of
shocks may be the result of the particular tax system adopted, but this issue
has not been carefully analysed in the literature. In any case, given that the
stabilizers are rule based they would in practice have to operate across diﬀerent
types of shocks, therefore they may be inappropriate for a particular type of
shock and still have desirable properties on average, see e.g. Spange (2004).
Another important point is that automatic stabilizers cannot distinguish be-
tween temporary and permanent changes. The eﬀects of aggregate shocks are
reﬂected in the budget balance and thereby accumulate over time if shocks are
persistent. The consequences of the past are therefore always reﬂected in the
budget (debt) position for the public sector. The reason why this is important
can most easily be seen by returning to the role taxation has in terms of au-
tomatic stabilization or insurance to variations in income. The public sector
provides an insurance function by raising more tax revenue in periods with high
income, and vice versa, cf.. above. This shows up as a procyclical budget.
However, the insurance which should be provided depends on the nature of the
shock, cf.. appendix B. Clearly, the case of a transitory shock leaves room for
diversiﬁcation of the shock, while oppositely it is not possible to diversify a per-
manent shock. If a permanent shock hits the economy, the budget will display a
systematic tendency towards budget imbalance, which is not sustainable (in the
case of adverse shocks due to solvency, and for favourable shocks due to political
reasons). However, automatic stabilizers entail an adjustment that is the same
irrespective of the nature of the shock to income - transitory or permanent -
and it is not realistic to perceive an implementable taxation system which does
not suﬀer from this problem. This has two implications. First, while the budget
provides some insurance, we are in a second best situation since the insurance is
not optimal across various temporal properties of the shock. Second, in practice,
persistent shocks would call for discretionary changes in ﬁscal policy to ensure
sustainability. This brings forth the important information problem of ﬁguring
out whether shocks are temporary or permanent, since discretionary changes in
ﬁscal policy are necessary in the latter but not former case. The development
from the mid 1970’s and onwards for many industrialized countries is a case in
point, since the crisis was perceived to be temporary, and the automatic stabi-
lizers were doing their job. The recession turned out to be more persistent than
perceived, and substantial budget balance problems were created, which even-
tually called for discretionary changes in ﬁscal policy to consolidate budgets. It
follows that there is no such thing as purely automatic reactions in ﬁscal policy.
Automatic stabilizers - too weak or too strong?
24Finally, note that it is also possible to design ﬁscal rules that pay attention to the implica-
tions for prices, since that is a question of nominal vs. real budgeting rules in the public sector
(see Andersen and Holden (2002)). The question of real vs. nominal budgeting procedures is
interesting since it brings up the trade-oﬀ between price and output stabilization extensively
d e b a t e di nr e l a t i o nt om o n e t a r yp o l i c yr u l e s . N ominal budgeting rules will obviously con-
tribute to achieving price stability, but they may cause more instable activity and therefore
consumption. The reason is that e.g. a negative supply shock will increase prices, which then
tend to reduce real public demand and therefore enlarge the real response to the shock
18Automatic stabilizers are widely appreciated, and a current consensus view
seems to be that ﬁscal policy should primarily be left to the automatic stabi-
lizers25. Automatic stabilizers are quantitatively important in all OECD coun-
tries, and the response is primarily generated from variations in taxation and
transfer payments, whereas public consumption plays a more modest role (see
e.g. van der Noord (2000), Auerbach and Feenberg (2000), and Braconier and
Holden (2001)). Moreover, there is a clear positive relation between the size of
automatic stabilizers and the size of the public sector.
A number of studies have assessed the stabilizing eﬀects of the automatic
stabilizers and have found that they have contributed to sizeable reductions in
output variability (see e.g. van der Noord (2000), Cohen and Follette (2000),
Brunilla et. al. (2002)).
Despite the strong emphasis on the automatic stabilizers, there has been
very scant discussion of whether the automatic stabilizers have the appropriate
strength. Given the broad consensus to let automatic stabilizers take care of
short run ﬁscal stabilization policy, this is surprising. With substantial varia-
tions in the size of the automatic stabilizers across countries, it is obvious to ask
whether they are too strong or too weak. Since they work, they could be either
too weak (in some countries) or too strong (in other countries). An important
issue here is whether the automatic stabilizers have the size they have by con-
struction or by hazard. On one hand, the empirical evidence clearly indicates
that other policy decisions determining the size of government also have impli-
cations for the size of automatic stabilizers. It is diﬃcult to perceive a large
public sector without automatic stabilizers becoming strong (not least from the
taxation side). On the other hand, when automatic stabilizers are interpreted as
providers of social or implicit insurance, it follows that automatic stabilizers can
be seen as the response to aggregate shocks arising from arrangements also serv-
ing a purpose in addressing idiosyncratic shocks. In this perspective one would
expect countries with extended welfare states also to have strong automatic
stabilizers because both reﬂect the same underlying demand for insurance.
The role of automatic stabilizers as providers of insurance is important in
relation to debates about the need for reforms of e.g. taxation system, social
security arrangements etc. Much of the policy debate and the academic litera-
ture has focused on the incentive eﬀects of these arrangement while neglecting
the insurance aspects. Accordingly, such analysis may overstate the costs of
various policies by neglecting the insurance aspects. The trend in tax reforms
has thus been to broaden tax bases and lowering marginal tax rates. While
this may have beneﬁcial incentive eﬀects, these policy changes may also reduce
automatic stabilizers and thus have a cost in increased volatility at the individ-
ual and aggregate level. Knieser and Ziliak (2002) consider the eﬀects of tax
reform in the US during the 1980s from this perspective, and ﬁnd that the wel-
fare costs from less insurance can be large, especially for relatively risk averse
households facing large income risk. Buti and van der Noord (2003) consider the
25This is clear in the socalled Maastricht assignment for the European Monetary Union
leaving centralized monetary policy to stabilize inﬂation, and decentralized ﬁscal authorities
to stabilize national output by primarily relying on the automatic stabilizers.
19same aspects from the perspective of diﬀerent types of shocks and the openness
of economies, and argue based on an empirical analysis for European countries,
that the automatic stabilizers may be too strong for some (very open) countries.
It is interesting to note one recent attempt to strengthen automatic stabiliz-
ers, namely the buﬀer funds in Finland (see Pekkarinen (2001)) to ensure more
ﬂexibility within the EMU. The scheme works via payroll taxes, and previously
a balanced budget rule made them move counter-cyclically. The funds make
the payroll taxes proportional (within limits) and thereby strengthen automatic
stabilizers26 (working via the supply side).
Finally, Buti et. al. (2003) raise the point that automatic stabilizers both
have a demand and a supply channel. The demand channel is the well-known
eﬀect running via disposable income, cf.. above, while the supply channel arises
because automatic stabilizers may also aﬀect supply incentives and thus the
slope of the (short-run) aggregate supply curve. Buti et. al. (2003) use a stan-
dard AS-AD macromodel and argue that stronger automatic stabilizers may
lead to a more inelastic aggregate supply curve and therefore the net eﬀect of
automatic stabilizers depends both on the type of shocks and the structure of
supply and demand (related to the level of taxation). It is argued that the au-
tomatic stabilizers may stabilize demand shocks, but de-stabilize supply shocks.
It is an interesting issue for further research to investigate the implications of
automatic stabilizers on the supply side. In an explicit microfounded model,
Andersen and Spange (2004) have both the supply and demand eﬀects of auto-
matic stabilizers, and ﬁnd that standard conclusions hold, even though business
cycles are driven by supply (technology) shocks. It is, however, well-known that
the eﬀects of taxation depend critically on the speciﬁcation of imperfections in
labour and product markets, and therefore there is need for more research in
this area.
6 Implementing stabilization policy - discretion
vs. rules
There is a fundamental question of rules vs. discretion in stabilization policy.
The debate in monetary policy is well-known, and reﬂected in the focus on
independent central banks and rule based monetary policies. Many of the same
issues arise for ﬁscal policy.
Consider discretionary ﬁscal policy. A key lesson from the theoretical consid-
erations is that the case for an active stabilization policy rests on two conditions,
i) the policy intervention is dependent on market imperfections and shocks, ii)
the intervention should be temporary in the sense that the timing should reﬂect
the shocks and the adjustment mechanisms working in the economy. This raises
problems in relation to both informationa n di m p l e m e n t a t i o na n di nr e l a t i o nt o
credibility and time-consistency.
26In principle the scheme also allows for the use of the fund in discretionary moves.
20It is obvious that an appropriate discretionary ﬁscal policy puts strong in-
formational demands in relation to knowledge on both the economic structure
(in particular adjustment processes) and the shocks impinging on the economy.
The latter includes both its nature (supply vs. demand) and its persistence
(temporary or vs. permanent). Some lags are inevitable in the process of accu-
mulating information, to which can be added lags in implementing the policy
changes and ﬁnally the eﬀect lags. All of these steps entail uncertainty, and the
lags raise a fundamental problem in targeting discretionary changes. When the
policy has eﬀect, would the need still be present? These problems point in the
direction of being very cautious in the use of discretionary policy changes and
restricting the use to the case of “large” shocks or situations where the economy
is caught in an expectation trap keeping output at a permanently low level.27
Hence, in "normal" situations one should leave ﬁscal stabilization to the auto-
matic stabilizers. Although they are not perfect, they operate automatically
and are informationally less demanding.
There are also various political economy or strategic aspects associated with
ﬁscal policy. Fiscal policy may have a time-consistent problem, which is quali-
tatively very similar to that of monetary policy. The temporary nature of the
intervention is important. Hence, there may be an incentive for policy markers
to undertake such changes and announce them as temporary. However, ex post
there may not be an incentive to redress the policy change. To the extent that
this is perceived, the eﬀectiveness of the intervention is reduced, cf.. section 4.
This is related to the issue of potential political bias or myopia, which may cre-
ate an incentive to run systematic budget deﬁcits since tax increases to ﬁnance
expanded outlays are postponed (see e.g. Alesina and Perotti (1995)).
To overcome the political bias problems in ﬁscal policy it has been sug-
gested28 to establish a “ﬁscal board” responsible for ﬁscal stabilization policy
(see e.g. Seidman (2001) for an account of the origin of this idea and Calmfors
(2003) for an overview of the recent debate). This idea is inspired by the debate
on and the subsequent establishment of independent central banks assigned a
well deﬁned objective. In a similar vein the idea of a “ﬁscal board” is to delegate
ﬁscal decision making to an independent institution to eliminate short run op-
portunistic behaviour in aﬀecting ﬁscal policies. Such a board would thus ensure
that changes in ﬁscal policy to stabilize the economy are both well adapted to the
business cycle situation and are temporary in nature. Thereby two problematic
aspects related to discretionary ﬁscal stabilization policies could be reduced.
Various proposals have been made in the literature for the structure and
mandate for such a ﬁscal board. The main idea is that politicians should decide
on the overall structure of ﬁscal policy depending on the political preferences
for public sector activities given the constraint of ﬁscal sustainability. The ﬁscal
board is entrusted with the responsibility for short run changes in ﬁscal policy
aiming at stabilizing the economy. A more soft version of the idea is that
27See e.g. van Haan (2004). Note that it is in itself informationally demanding to establish
whether there are multiple equilibria.
28In Sweden there has been an explicit proposal for such a board, see Swedish Commission
on Stabilization Policy in EMU.
21the board does not have any formal decision power, but plays the role of an
advisory board making recommendations on the room and scope for changes in
ﬁscal policy, and thereby raising the political cost of opportunistic policies.
One problem with this proposal is that it implicitly relies on the perception
that it is possible to separate the tasks of allocation, distribution and stabiliza-
tion for governments. Although this problem can also be said to be present for
monetary policy, it is the case that ﬁscal policy to a larger extent relates to
distributional issues. As argued above, it is impossible to separate the distribu-
tional and insurance aspects, and therefore the democratic deﬁcit in delegating
ﬁscal policy will be larger than for monetary policy. It is therefore hardly real-
istic to foresee politicians accepting the idea of an independent ﬁscal board as
easily as an independent central bank. This could also be expressed in the way
that it would be more diﬃcult to formulate a precise mandate for a ﬁscal board
than for a central bank.
Another point is that an attempt to separate stabilization and allocation
may restrict the feasible policy options. Often reforms aiming at allocational
objectives will also have potential short “stabilization” eﬀects. If there are e.g.
good reasons to implement a tax reform, it may be appropriate to do this when
the economy is also in need of a ﬁscal stimulus, since the two objectives can
be met by phasing in the tax reform such that it initially is “underﬁnanced”.
This may also make it easier to attain support for the reform. With short run
stabilization delegated to an independent ﬁscal board, it would be very diﬃcult
to implement such a “package”, or to put it diﬀerently, it raises new coordination
issues.
7C o n c l u d i n g r e m a r k s
A key distinction, which is often confused in the literature, is between the long-
run eﬀects of ﬁscal policy and stabilization policy. By the former is understood
the long run eﬀects of permanent changes in public consumption and taxation,
while by stabilization policy is understood temporary variations in public con-
sumption and taxes. In most models, the long run eﬀects of ﬁscal policy are
driven by supply eﬀects, i.e. aggregate demand plays no role for the level of ac-
tivity, and therefore the eﬀects of ﬁscal policy become a question of how various
supply incentives are aﬀected. It is misleading to infer anything about the scope
for an active ﬁscal stabilization policy. from the long run eﬀects of changes in
ﬁscal policy. If aggregate demand plays a role for determination of activity in
the short run, it follows that temporary variations in public consumption or
taxation can have important eﬀects and can be used to stabilize the economy,
even though the long run multipliers may be negative.
The critical question for an active ﬁscal stabilization policy is the ability
to adjust the intervention appropriately given the nature of shocks and the
structure of the economy. It is much easier to establish a principle case for an
active stabilization policy than to implement it in practice. There are thus good
reasons to be very cautious in the use of ﬁscal stabilization policy in the sense of
22only resorting to such measures in "exceptional" situations. In "normal" cases
stabilization should be left to the automatic stabilizers.
However, automatic stabilizer are what they are more by chance than by
design, that is, they are the net result of policy decisions in various areas, which
rarely are made with a consideration of their eﬀect for the overall strength of the
automatic stabilizers. More research on these issues is needed for several reasons.
First, to consider whether it is possible to amend the automatic stabilizers
through other means, e.g. buﬀer funds. Second to take into account the trade
oﬀ between insurance and incentive when considering policy reforms in other
areas. Finally, to consider the scope for reﬁning the automatic stabilizers so that
they work more appropriately for various types of shocks. Given the reliance
on automatic stabilizers, the marginal value of further insights on these issues
is potentially large.
Appendix A
This appendix develops an illustrative intertemporal model to show the po-
tential stabilizing role of ﬁscal policy.






tZt , 0 <δ<1
where Y denotes output, L labour input, and Z a productivity shocks, cf. below.
In logs labour demand and output supply can be stated as (x ≡ lnX)








It is assumed that zt is iid N(0,σ2).






















where C denotes consumption, L work and ( M
P ) the liquidity services provided























where it+j is the one period nominal rate of interest in period t+j, τ the income
tax rate, and Π the proﬁts distributed to households due to their ownership of
ﬁrms.











which written in logs reads (disregarding constants)
ct = Ect+1 − σ(it − (Ept+1 − pt)) (4)
where σ = 1
γ and ln(1 + i) ∼ = i.
Wage setting
Assume that wages are pre-set by a utilitarian union under a right to manage
structure, i.e. the union knows that labour demand is determined by (2). The












(1 − Lt)−η 
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where   is the elasticity of labour demand. Using that all stochastic variables
have expected values zero, it follows that the wage setting rule can be written
wt = ω + Et−1pt (5)
Actual employment is determined by labour demand as long as the marginal







t ≥ (1 − Lt)−η 
For latter reference denote the maximum employment level satisfying this con-
straint l. Using (5) and (3) aggregate supply can be written (neglecting con-
stants)
ys
t = γ(pt − Et−1pt)+ zt (6)
Interest rate setting
The central bank is determining the nominal interest rate (money supply is
therefore accommodation money demand) and for simplicity the policy reaction
function is postulated to be
it = r + χ(pt − pt−1) (7)
i.e. the higher the observed inﬂation (pt −pt−1) the higher the nominal interest
rate set by the central bank. The parameter χ measure how aggressive the
central bank reacts to observed inﬂation. Inserting (7) in (4) yields
ct = Ect+1 − σ(χ(pt − pt−1) − (Ept+1 − pt))
Public sector
























The level of public consumption in any period (deviation from steady state) is
given as
gt = µt
where µ has the interpretation as either an exogenous change in public consump-
tion, or a discretionary change in ﬁscal policy conditional on some underlying
changes in the state of the economy. It is assumed that Et−1µt.
Product market equilibrium
The equilibrium condition for the product market Yt = Ct + Gt can be
w r i t t e ni nl o g s 29
yt =( 1− λ)ct + λgt (8)
This gives the aggregate demand relation which combined with the aggregate
supply relation (6)
It is easiest to solve the model by the undetermined coeﬃcients methods,
and to this end conjecture that consumption in equilibrium is given as
ct = ϕ1µt + ϕ2zt (9)
note that this implies Ect+1 =0 , and equilibrium prices are given as
pt = θ1pt−1 + θ2εt + θ3zt (10)
To verify these conjectures using (10) in (8) and (6) implies that the equilibrium
price level can be written
pt =[ γ +( 1− λ)σ(χ − (θ1 − 1))]
−1 [(γθ1 +( 1− λ)σχ)pt−1 + λεt −  zt]
which is consistent with (10) provided
θ1 =
γθ1 +( 1− λ)σχ




γ +( 1− λ)σ
θ3 = −
 
γ +( 1− λ)σ
Using the solution for the price level in the aggregate supply relation (6) equi-
librium activity can be determined as
29Using the approximation ln(Xt + Yt) ' X
X+Y lnXt + Y
X+Y lnYt,w h e r eX and Y denote
the steady state values of Xt and Yt, respectively.
25yt = γθ2µt +( γθ3 +  )zt
Note that
0 <γ θ 2 =
γλ
γ +( 1− λ)σχ
≤ λ










γ +( 1− λ)σχ
¶
≤  
i.e. both public consumption and productivity shocks boost activity, but the
eﬀect on equilibrium output is less than the impact eﬀect, i.e. there is some
crowding out. Note that this holds only for yt < yt = δlt + zt
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γ +( 1− λ)σχ
¸
ϕ2 =  
µ
σχ
γ +( 1− λ)σχ
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Appendix B
This appendix clariﬁes the diﬀerent scope in diversifying transitory and per-
manent shocks via automatic stabilizers.
For the sake of argument consider the limiting case where there is no pri-
vate capital market for human capital, implying that all agents are liquidity
constrained, that is, consumption (C) is equal to current (labour) income (Y )
assumed to be time dependent, i.e.
Ct = Yt






where β is the subjective discount factor. It is a straightforward implication
of risk aversion (U0 > 0,U00 < 0) that there are welfare gains to be reaped by
smoothing consumption. Since this is not possible for private agents due to
capital market incompleteness, the question is what type of smoothing should
be oﬀered by the public sector.
26Consider ﬁrst the optimal consumption smoothing a central planner will
choose if resources can be transferred over time via e.g. an international capital
market at a real rate of return r (assumed constant). In this case the intertem-
















where r is the market interest rate (assumed constant for simplicity). Con-
sumption smoothing implies that





















The basic point is that the optimal smoothing or risk diversiﬁcation calls
for diﬀerent adjustment to transitory and permanent changes in income. This
insight clearly generalizes beyond the speciﬁc example considered here.
Turn next to diversiﬁcation oﬀered by the public sector via automatic sta-
bilizers. If we focus on the insurance eﬀect disregarding the need to ﬁnance










Assume that the transfer is implemented as a tax on income, i.e.
Tt+j = τ (yt+j)yt+j
where τ (yt+j) gives the tax rate as a function of income. The consumption
for a liquidity constrained household reads
ct+j =( 1− τ (yt+j))yt+j
and the adjustment of consumption to a change in income will be given as
∂ct+j
∂yt+j
=1− τ (yt+j) − τ0 (yt+j)yt+j
27For the consumption of liquidity constrained households to become equiva-
lent to the optimal adjustment to temporary variations in income, we require




















1 − τ(yt+j)(1 + r)
τ(yt+j)(1 + r
> 0 (11)
that is, the tax rate has to move procyclically. However, for a permanent
income change, we require






the tax rate has to move countercyclical to ensure that the transfer is un-
aﬀected. Clearly, a more complicated and realistic case involves shocks that
are persistent but not permanent. This example has the following implications:
(i) it is impossible by simple contingencies in taxation to ensure optimal risk
diversiﬁcation to both transitory and permanent shocks (conditions (11) and
(12) cannot be simultaneous fulﬁlled), (ii) a given choice of a rule would require
discretionary changes once information on the type of shock unravels since per-
manent shocks would be reﬂected in debt dynamics.
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